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tion points to a need for insurance coverage against the merchants' risk. Through the
insurance companies a standardization of the practises of storekeepers in such situations could be effected which would give a maximum of assistance to the federal
authorities with a minimum of interference to the customer and embarrassment to the
storekeeper.'s
Torts-Privacy-Trade-Piracy-Unpermitted Broadcast of Horse Race-[Australia].-The defendant broadcasting company leased the premises adjoining the plaintiff's commercial racecourse and built an elevated platform overlooking the track.
From this vantage point it proceeded to broadcast the races. The plaintiff charged admission to the track and stipulated on the tickets that the purchaser agree not to disclose any information concerning the races for the day. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant's acts resulted in a decrease in the patronage of the track and sought an
injunction to restrain the broadcasting of the races. Held, suit dismissed. The defendants acquired the information lawfully and its subsequent broadcasting was not under the circumstances unfair to the plaintiff. Victoria Park Racing and Recreation
Grounds Co., Ltd. v. Taylor and others.,
The instant case illustrates once more judicial hesitancy to grant relief in the
absence of injury to a conventionally recognized property right. Too simple a notion
of property has prevented courts from recognizing familiar problems under new fact
2

situations.

The legality of the defendant's viewing the race, considered apart from the subsequent use of the information so obtained, depends on the extent to which a landowner
can keep his property free from interferences having a foreign source. It is clear that
he has a right to have his land free from the impact of tangible substances,3 and from
the intrusion of things less tangible such as unpleasant sounds4 and noisome odors.S
This protection has even been extended to the interference with sunlight where
maliciously caused.6 But where the interference is merely an intrusion upon privacy
no relief is given,except where the loss of privacy affects the rental value of the land.8
Therefore, in the instant case, the plaintiff could not prevent the defendant from viewing his land on the grounds of privacy, particularly since he was holding his land open
to the public; and the economic loss to the plaintiff of an admission price was too
trivial to warrant judicial attention.
Legal access to information, however, does not necessarily imply a right to indisIsCf. similar attempts in combating shoplifting.
137 N.S.W. 322 (1937). A contrary result was obtained by the New York court. Time
85 (Sept. 6, 1937).

'See remarks of Erle, J., in Jefferys v. Boosey, 4 H.L.C. 815, 869 ff. (1854).
3Harper, Law of Torts, § 204 (933).
sIbid.
6
at § 181.
Id., at § 187.
'Chandler v. Thompson, 3 Camp. 8o (i81i); Bryant v. Sholars, xo4 La. 786, 29 So. 350
(igoi). See also Tapling v. Jones, ii H.L.C. 290, 305 (1865); Winfield, Privacy, 47 Law Q.
Rev. 23, 2 4 ff. (1931).
8 Odell v. New York El. R.R. Co., 130 N.Y. 523, 29 N.E. 997 (1892); Duke of Buccleuch
v. Metropolitan Board of Works, L.R. 5 H.L. 418 (1871), reversing L.R. 5 Ex. 221 (1870).

4Id.,
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criminate use and dissemination. Thus, an agent upon the termination of his employment may not use the trade secrets of his former employer to his own advantage.9
Again, a spectator properly admitted to the performance of an unpublished play is not
permitted subsequently to publish it ;" nor does the recipient of a private letter acquire
a right to publication." It would appear therefore that the absence of a trespass by
the defendant in getting the information does not necessarily foreclose the question of
the legality of the subsequent use of it.
An interest similar to that in the instant case has occasionally been protected by
courts who chose to state their result in terms of trespass. In Hickman v. Maisey,'" the
defendant timed the trials of the plaintiff's race horse from the vantage point of the
adjoining highviay to which the plaintiff held the fee, and subsequently published the
data. The court found that so unreasonable a use of the highway was not within the
terms of the easement to the public and consequently held that the defendant was a
trespasser ab initio. It is hard to believe that the court would resort to such a technical
category of liability unless it assumed that the plaintiff's interest in the information
was entitled to protection against publication.'3 But even an ingenious court could
hardly extend this device to the instant case where the defendant was on his own
land.
In other analogous cases courts have faced directly the problem of protecting a man
from the misappropriation and dissemination of something which although intangible
is peculiarly his. The so-called piracy cases furnish a good example. In the celebrated
Associated Presscase,14 defendant news service was enjoined from circulating plaintiff's
dispatches until they had lost their news value. It would seem that this doctrine has
been extended somewhat beyond news cases by UproarCo. v. Nat. BroadcastingCo.'s
in which the publication in a cheap form of the script used in a sponsored radio program was enjoined on the ground that it might impair the good will of the sponsor,
created by the program. But this approach has been rejected in cases involving the
9Rest., Agency §§ 395, 404 (1933).
zMacklin v. Richardson, Ambler 694 (1770); Palmer v. DeWitt, 47 N.Y. 532 (1872);

Aronson v. Baker, 43 N.J. Eq. 365, 12 At. 177 (i888). Same as to lectures, Copinger, Law of
Copyright 3 6 ff. (7th ed. 1936).
1 Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402 (188); Denis v. Leclerc, i Mart. (La.) 297 (i8ii).
12 [i9oo] i Q.B. 752. Accord: Harrison v. Duke of Rutland, [x893] i Q.B. 142 (scaring away
game); Adams v. Rivers, ii Barb. (N.Y.) 39o (x85i) (uttering abusive language).
'3 Thus in Sports & General Press Agency, Ltd., v. "Our Dogs" Pub. Co., Ltd., [i916]
2 K.B. 88o, aff'd [1917] 2 K.B. 125, the court, in contrast to the Hickman case, refused to enjoin the defendant from publishing photographs taken at a dog show, even though he had been
aware of the sale of the exclusive rights and warned against taking pictures. By analogy, the
court could have easily under the circumstances found an implied obligation not to publish.
'4 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). For earlier casesimplying similar doctrine, see: Nat. Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., rig Fed. 294
(C.C.A. 7 th 1902); Fonotipia, Ltd. v. Bradley, 17 Fed. 951 (C.C. N.Y. 19o9).
IS8i F. (2d) 373 (C.C.A. ist 1936), cert. den. 298 U.S. 670 (1936). See also Associated Press
v. KVOS, 8o F. (2d) 575 (C.C.A. 9th 1935) (broadcasting company pirating plaintiff's news
enjoined), rev'd and remanded with instructions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, 299 U.S.
269 (1936).
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copying of designs 6 or the appropriating of advertising schemes. The potentialities
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of the analogy to the
group of cases. Perhaps the analogy has been obscured because the element of public
8
deception has loomed unnecessarily large in the rationale of the trade-name cases.'
The primary reason for protecting this means of identifying merchandise is to protect
the owner of the trade-name from the misappropriation by his competitor; deception of
the public being merely a test of private loss.19 The plaintiff establishes a case by
showing the loss or threat of loss of a trade expectancy which he can be said to have
created. 2" At first, courts recognized the possibility of diversion of sales only where the
name was used on a competing product. 2 Protection was gradually given in cases of
similar but not directly competing goods, e.g., self-playing pianos and phonographs
on the theory that in the normal expansion of the plaintiff's enterprise, it might ultimately take in the defendant's product." Finally, protection was cautiously extended
to cases of completely dissimilar goods, where no element of unfair competition entered,
on the theory that the use by others of the plaintiff's name might weaken its rhetoric

value and ultimately result in the loss of sales.'3

Even though in the instant case the plaintiff and the defendant are hardly in direct
competition, each is appealing to the interests of the sport-loving members of the
community, and in any event the possibility of loss to the plaintiff is none the less
x6 Cheyney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F. (2d) 279 (C.C.A. 2d 1929), cert. den. 281 U.S.
728 (1930).
'1 Westminster Laundry Co. v. Hesse Envelope Co., 174 Mo. App. 238, 156 S.W. 767 (1913);

Gotham Music Service v. D. &H. Music Pub. Co., 259 N.Y. 86, i81 N.E. 57 (1932) (two judges
dissenting on authority of Associated Press case); cf. Coca-Cola Co. v. Old Dominion Beverage
Corp., 271 Fed. 6oo (C.C.A. 4th 1921), cert. den. 256 U.S. 703 (1921).
i8 Nims, Unfair Competition § 8 (3 d ed. 1929).
9Nims, id., at § 9; McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1877); Nu-Enamel Corp. v. Armstrong Paint &Varnish Works, 8i F. (2d) i (C.C.A. 7 th 1936); National Biscuit Co., v. Kellogg
Co., 91 F. (2d) 150 (C.C.A. 3d 1937), cert. den. 58 S. Ct. 120 (1937); Riggs Optical Co. v. Riggs,
132 Neb. 26, 270 N.W. 667 (I937); see also Fed. Trade Comm. v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 27
(1929).

20 Wall v. Rolls-Royce of America, 4 F. (2d) 333 (C.C.A. 3d 1925); Standard Oil Co. of
New Mexico v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 56 F. (2d) 973 (C.C.A. ioth 1933); Colorado Nat. Co.
v. Colorado Nat. Bank of Denver, 95 Colo. 386, 36 P. (2d) 454 (1934).
"Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden Condensed Milk Co., 201 Fed. 5IO (C.C.A. 7th 1912).
Wilcox & White Co. v. Leiser, 276 Fed. 445 (S.D. N.Y. i918); Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C.
Dowd & Co., 178 Fed. 73 (C.C.A. 2d igio); Standard Oil Co. of New Mexico v. Standard Oil
Co. of Cal., 56 F. (2d) 973 (C.C.A. ioth 1933). For cases advocating theory of confusion upon
consumer see Wolff, Non-Competing Goods in Trade-mark Law, 37 Col. L. Rev. 582, 592 ff.

(1937).

'3 This theory is advocated by Schechter, Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40
Harv. L. Rev. 813, 824 ff. (1927); Schechter, Fog and Fiction in Trademark Protection, 36
Col. L. Rev. 6o, 81 ff. (1936); Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc., 147 Misc. 241, 264
N.Y. Supp. 459 (1932), aff'd 262 N.Y. 482, 188 N.E. 30 (1933); Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F. (2d) 973, 974 (C.C.A. 2d 1928); cf. L. E. Waterman & Co. v. Gordon, 72 F. (2d) 272
(C.C.A. 2d 1934); see also Alfred Dunhiil of London, Inc. v. Dunhill Shirt Shop, 3 F. Supp. 487
(N.Y. 1929); Churchill Downs Distilling Co. v. Churchill Downs, Inc., 262 Ky. 567, 90 S.W.

(2d) 1041 (1936).
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real. Conceivably, the plaintiff might go into the "business" of selling his broadcasting
privileges and consequently come into direct conflict with the defendant.24 Or, as was
alleged in the case, the effect of the broadcasting of the races might be to decrease the
attendance at the track.2s This result should warrant relief on the analogy of the tradename cases involving completely dissimilar goods.
There remains the question of how much of his own the defendant must add to
what he has taken from the plaintiff to make the product or result legally his. In the
instant case, it may be argued that the defendant transformed the mere observation
of the horse race into an exciting broadcast, embroidered with entertaining sidelights
and instructive interpretation. But this argument by analogy seems a most far-fetched
and hopeless justification for the defendant's appropriation and dissemination of the
plaintiff's show.
One final consideration remains. The result of protecting the plaintiff is to promote
his acquisition of future income by strengthening his monopoly of the means of acquiring it. Since the ultimate purpose of protecting such monopoly is to encourage the
enterprise, the final decision may well turn on the social desirability of the plaintiff's
activity. In any event, a matter of such fundamental social importance might well be
left for the legislature.26

Trusts-Liability of Corporate Trustee-Court Order as a Defense to Trustee's
Liability-[Texas].-A corporation deposited securities with the defendant, trustee,
and issued participation certificates. The trust indenture contained an exculpatory
clause exempting the trustee from liability except for "gross negligence or wilful
default." Thereafter, a receiver was appointed for the settlor corporation and he on
behalf of go% of the trust beneficiaries, requested the receivership court to order the
defendant to deliver the securities to him. Accordingly, the decree was granted in
which it was also provided that the receiver should perform the duties of the original
trustee. The defendant, evidently knowing that not all the beneficiaries were represented, complied with the court order. Subsequently, the plaintiff, who was a certificate
holder, but not one of the go% represented by the receiver, filed suit for breach of trust
against the trustee. Held, the beneficiaries are necessary parties to a proceeding that
destroys the trust or materially alters its terms. Since the plaintiff was not a party in
the receivership court, the decree was no justification for the trustee's action. Nat'l
Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Bruce.,
The standards measuring the liabilities of a trustee under an indenture have not
been clearly defined by the decisions. Writers disagree on whether the standards applicable to the family trustee can be properly applied to the corporate trustee since the
24 In the United States, broadcasting and motion picture rights have become commercial
assets in both amateur and professional sports. Lit. Dig. 33 (Oct. 5, I935); Lit. Dig. 41 (Sept.
19, 1936); Phillips, Hold 'Em Mike, Sat. Eve. Post 25 (Oct. 17, 1936); Time 85 (Sept. 6, 1937).
2sMany colleges in the United States do not permit broadcasting of football games on the
theory that it cuts into the gate-receipts. Lit. Dig. 41 (Sept. ig, 1936).

26See Brandeis, J., dissenting in International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S.
248 (igi8); Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 Iowa L. Rev. 17s, 1g (1936).
105 S.W. (2d) 882 (1937).
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